INTRODUCTION:

Due to Nepal’s geographical proximity, socio-cultural unity and economic dependence, India has taken several steps to keep Nepal under its influence from the very beginning. India made arrangements to protect Nepal from any external aggression. In March 1949, Nehru spoke about his policy towards Nepal, “the Indian Government can’t tolerate an invasion of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between two countries.”¹ In other words, despite the absence of any military alliance in Nepal, it is not possible for the Indian government to accept any intervention in Nepal.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY:

The aim of this research paper is to analyse the India-Nepal bilateral relations during the 1950s from different perspectives and the influence of China.

Due to Nepal’s geographical position, it plays a very important role in India’s security and strategic sphere. And India was always trying to keep Nepal in its gripe since its independence. On the other hand, China was always trying to reduce India’s authority in South Asia as well as Nepal. Therefore, China used the negativity of India-Nepal bilateral relations to increase its influence. So present research is trying to find out various China’s policy for this ai during the 1950s.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE:

Mullik, B. N. (1971). The Chinese Betrayal. Allied Publishers. This was a monumental work in this field. The author had personal experiences of working with high-level officials and foreign policymakers. He critically analysed Nehru’s idealistic stance on India’s foreign policy especially relations with China.

Ghoble, T. R. (1992). India and China - Nepal Relations, 1950-1980: An Appraisal. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 53, 598–606. In this article author, T.R. Ghoble analysed the triangle relations among three countries. Nepal’s geopolitical position is very crucial for both countries-India and China in respect of their security challenges. China was very anxious for Tibetan refugees and India was very cautious for China. In this background, the author emphasised Nepal’s balanced foreign policy with its two neighbours.

Kumar, S. (2011). China’s Expanding Footprint in Nepal: Threats to India. Journal of Defence Studies, 5(2) 77-89. As a landlocked country, Nepal was very

much dependent on India for various purposes like

international trade. But after China’s encroachment into Tibet, the security set-up of The Himalayan Region was changed. Over this background, the author analysed the various steps of China towards Nepal to reduce its dependence on India and dominate over Nepal which was a security concern for India.

HYPOTHESIS:

i. Nepal believed in a balanced foreign policy;

ii. Internal politics of Nepal influenced its foreign policy;

iii. India was very anxious about China’s expansionist attitude;

iv. Some political parties/ leaders of Nepal used anti-Indian feelings of Nepali people to gain their personal goals.

METHODOLOGY:

‘Mixes Methods’ has been used in this study. This research paper is mainly based on secondary sources. The secondary data were collected from various secondary sources. Major sources of secondary data comprise published articles in journals; books of eminent authors; well-researched dissertations on the subject concerned; editorials in magazines; and relevant columns in newspapers. To trace governmental as well as non-government organisations’ websites for data assistance, the help of the internet was also taken.

India has never interfered or tried to interfere in the sovereignty of Nepal. Nehru emphasized the commonality of the interests of both countries and the issue of India’s special status in Nepal. On the other hand, in order to maintain an independent and distinct identity from India, the Nepalese government and the elite ruling class took the initiative to use Nepal’s proximity to China. Ever since Nepal emerged as a well-organized state under the Shah dynasty, whenever Nepal developed relations with India, it showed China’s proximity to India, but of course, the form or dimension of that proximity changed over time. But Mao Zedong’s occupation of Peking on January 31,1949, and Peking Radio’s declaration on September 10 about China’s annexation of Tibet called into question India’s strategic position and security in the Himalayan region.²

The question here is why the Tibetan occupation by China was detrimental to India’s security? The answer to this question can be found in Mao Zedong’s strategic theory called “Right Plam Five Fingers”, which focused

on the palm of the right hand and the fingers of the right hand are Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh. Historically, China’s claim on Nepal can be traced back to 1792 when the joint Tibetan and Chinese armies defeated the Nepalese Gurkha forces at Nawakot. Nawakot was located twenty miles from the capital Kathmandu. Later, Chinese authorities and researchers claimed that Nepal had recognized China’s sovereignty at that time, a claim that was strongly opposed by the Nepalese authorities. The Nepalese believed that the Chinese general had come too close to Kathmandu and was forced to withdraw his troops because they feared that they might die completely if they entered Kathmandu. But it is undeniable that until 1908, the Gurkha kings of Nepal made arrangements for the delivery of gifts every five years and in 1857, in retaliation for the previous defeat, it reclaimed the land it had lost to Tibet and forced the Tibetans to donate 10,000 rupees per year in revenue. China claimed that both Nepal and Tibet recognized the Chinese emperor as their landlord in the Treaty of 1857, as in 1892.³

However, there is disagreement among researchers on this point. Mr. Perceval Landon, a historical document translated from Nepali into English, claimed that the form that the Chinese emperor had previously revered by both would be revered in the future as well. The document, translated from Tibetan to English by Aitchison, also stated that the Chinese emperor would be honored in the future as both states had done in the past. Whatever the conflicting views, the important thing is that China considered Nepal as one of its allies. Since four years after Colonel Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa in 1904, in 1908 the Tibetan authorities were forced by agreement to allow Chinese citizens to live in Lhasa. Based on this, the colonel demanded sovereignty over Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. He told the Nepalese authorities that Nepal and Tibet would work together as brothers under the auspices of China for the good of both. According to him, China, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim together present a mixture of five colours.⁴

Although the dynasty of emperors changed in China, their attitude towards Nepal did not change. For example, after the Manchu dynasty in 1911, the Kuomintang rulers made the same demand. In 1939, Mao Zedong listed Nepal as a Chinese colony in a manifesto entitled The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. He wrote, “In defeating Chia in war, the imperialist states have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took away Korea, Taiwan and Ryuku islands, the Pescadores, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao.”⁵ After the intervention in Tibet in October 1950, Yong-Sang-Kim, the chief official of the Central Office of the Communist Party of China, said that after the liberation of Tibet, the people of China and Nepal would unite to defend Asia and safeguard world peace.⁶

This analysis shows the extent to which Tibet’s intervention in China posed a strategic challenge to India. In this historic context, the “Peace and Friendship Treaty” was signed between Nepal and India on 31 July 1950. According to this agreement, “neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two governments shall consult each other and devise effective counter-measures.”⁷ In light of China’s intervention in Tibet, the clause refers to China as a threat to Indian security in Nepal. It can therefore be said that India followed a realistic approach towards China from the very beginning in the formation of India-Nepal bilateral relations.

To understand the special relationship that developed between India and Nepal as a result of the “Peace and Friendship Treaty” and China’s position in this regard, two aspects need to be mentioned. For some time after the agreement, China refrained from taking any aggressive action against Nepal as it could cause India’s monogamy and disrupt China’s interests in Tibet. Second, China was plagued by two problems at the time (the Korean War and the unrest in Tibet), so it was reluctant to escalate.

The Himalayan state, Nepal occupies an important geo-strategic position between India and China. Nepal is the gateway to the Indo-Gangetic plain. After China annexed Tibet in 1950, Nepal’s strategic importance in the international arena increased as it was located between India and Chinese-occupied Tibet. India’s concern over Nepal was heightened over its security and keeping its nearest neighbour free from Chinese influence. China has always sought to remove India’s influence in Nepal and establish its influence. In this respect, both India and China have vast ‘strategic and psychological value’ to Nepal’s land. Once China can establish its influence in Nepal and control it, North India will be easily accessible to them. The southern plains of Nepal are connected to the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where a large part of the Indian industry is located. The Siliguri Corridor and the important port of Calcutta are not far from the trilateral borders of Bhutan, China and India. If China seeks to infiltrate on both sides, then India’s fears are always there. India has always been aware of China’s communist influence in Nepal and it knew the danger could come not only as an armed attack from Tibet but also as an incursion or a coup d’etat. India was determined to prevent communist influence in Nepal.⁸

The Himalayas stands like a wall between Nepal and Tibet. The Karakoram Mountains have at least eight ravines that connect China’s Sinkiang / Xinjiang with the region and are usable in all seasons. At least ten important passes connect Ladakh and Xinjiang to the north and Tibet to the east. Each of these passes was occupied by China. In 1957, China built a road that followed the old trade route that connected China’s Xinjiang to Tibet. This road is known as the National Highway No. 219 of China which extends over the Aksai Chin region. In 1960, China built another road on the west side of the road that would enter Xinjiang via the Qara Tagh Pass and connect Tibet via the Lanak Pass.⁹ At the time, China’s infrastructural development posed a major strategic challenge to India, creating insecurity along India’s entire northern border.

There are several passes to cross the Himalayas in the north of Nepal, including the Nara Pass; Kodari Pass and Rasa Pass are notable. The Lhasa-Kathmandu Road (via the Kodari Pass), built by China, is a modern version of the ancient trade route. Which is strategically enough to put India’s northern border in jeopardy. The plains of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar merge with the plains of Nepal in the north. The greatest geographical importance of the Nepal-Tibetan border is that the infiltration from the north of this border threatened the Indo-Gangetic plain with major security problems. Thus, India’s defence system was linked to Chinese intervention in Tibet and increasing Chinese influence in Nepal.¹⁰

The Sikkim-Tibetan border has many passes, the most important of which is the Nathu Pass. The Lhasa-Yatung Road in Tibet is accessible at all times of the year and extends to the Nathu Pass. The Chumbi Valley in Tibet extends to the tip of the nose in Darjeeling and then the Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal, and China has been involved in military development in the region from the very beginning. The Chicken Neck in Jalpaiguri district (the area between Bangladesh and Nepal) is only 150 miles from this Chumbi valley.¹¹ Kuti and Kerong are the easiest access pass on the Sino-Nepalese border. These two passes are under Chinese control which has given it an additional geo-strategic advantage.¹²

This natural geostrategic location of Nepal, the Himalayas in the north and the urban areas in the south have merged with the Indian plains. Military operations of any kind are far more convenient from north to south than from south to north, which has given the Chinese military in Tibet many advantages. In the late 1950s, Tibet was not only connected to China by road, but in Tibet, China also developed other infrastructure to solve its logistical problems. The mainland of China is far away from Nepal. Nepal, on the other hand, is considered to be the widest geographical area of the Indo-Gangetic plain.

In the first part, it was mentioned that in this case, India took a realistic approach to Nepal from the very beginning. India took all possible steps to prevent the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between Nepal and China. China’s intervention in Tibet and India’s neutral stance on the issue has prompted calls from some Nepalese people to reconsider Sino-Nepalese relations. But then, due to Indian influence, the Nepalese government was waiting for its guidance and initiative. However, at the time, Delhi did not welcome any initiative by Nepal in this regard, unless India came to an agreement with China on Tibet or any other Himalayan state. When the Nepali Congress passed a resolution on establishing Nepal’s relations with China, India’s advice was that Nepal could establish relations with China on its own, but not before China-India reached a consensus.¹³

China was also willing to negotiate with India before establishing relations with Nepal and China wanted to establish relations through India. For example, after the end of the autocratic Rana dynasty in Nepal, talks were held with Chinese chief Zhou En-lai and K.M. Panikkar of India. Nepal also agreed that any decision on establishing Nepal-China relations would be based on a Sino-Indian consensus. However, there were subtle differences between India’s and Nepal’s position on China’s rights in Tibet. Delhi first denied direct ties with the Dalai Lama government in Tibet and explicitly recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet. But Nepal refused to give up the rights it enjoyed in Tibet. In late April 1954, Nepal’s Prime Minister Koirala declared Tibet’s relations with Nepal “free from Chinese control”.¹⁴

Under the China-Indian Treaty of April 1954, India recognized Tibet as a self-governing territory of China. According to the agreement signed between China and India in April 1954, India recognized Tibet as an autonomous region of China. China, on the other hand, agreed with India and recognized India’s priority in the Himalayan states, which included Sikkim, Bhutan as well as Nepal. Nehru unilaterally repeatedly expressed a clear view of India’s interests and position in these states but China never objected.¹⁵ The 1954 Sino-Indian Treaty, signed to recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet, had a huge impact on the security of India’s northern border. Independent Tibet was a buffer state between China and India, which was abolished by the treaty. Therefore, in the case of India, it was essential to keep Nepal under its influence. This requirement applied not only to Nepal but also to Bhutan and the then independent state of Sikkim. Aiming at the India-China consensus, the Nepalese government also took steps to reconsider China’s relations with Nepal. Because after the victory in the Tibet-Nepal war in 1856, the benefits that Nepal had been receiving from the Tibetan government could not be taken into account in the changed circumstances. So soon after the India-China meeting centred on Tibet, Nepal's Foreign Minister D.R. Regmi and Raja Tribhuvan discussed the situation in New Delhi on May 1, 1954. At that meeting, the Indian government advised the Nepalese leadership to reconsider Nepal’s position in Tibet in the changed circumstances and to regularize Nepal’s relations with China.¹⁶

It is clear from that meeting that India never intended to present Nepal to China as its “Sphere of Influence”. It was decided at the meeting that both governments would continue to coordinate with each other in the conduct of their foreign policy, the Government of Nepal would consult with the Government of India on its foreign policy and relations with foreign countries and in any other matters and the case of Tibet and China, in particular, the Government of India would be consulted when formulating foreign policy. However, due to the tense situation in Nepal and anti-India sentiment, the Nepalese government has not signed any agreement that would force them to do so. Nevertheless, Nepal accepted India’s advice in formulating China’s policy.¹⁷ At a press conference after returning from a visit to China at that time, Nehru declared that Beijing had recognized Nepal as an area of influence of Delhi and that China had no intention of using Dr. K.I.Singh who started a guerrilla communist movement in Nepal. Nehru believed that the Nepalese government would conduct China-Nepal diplomatic relations as their own.¹⁸

India played both direct and indirect roles in the development of China’s relations with Nepal. But Nepal alleged that India had in many cases played an arrogant role in determining its foreign policy. As a result, Nepal became dissatisfied with India. The improvement in China-Nepal relations after King Mahendra came to power terrified India. Nepal’s new Prime Minister Anaka Prasad Acharya’s visit to China in 1956 and Chinese President Zhou En-lai’s visit to Nepal in 1958, and how they emphasized the historical and ethnic context in determining Nepal-China relations, made India feel that the two countries Trying to build relationships bypassing its role. As a result, India realized that it was losing its grip on Nepal. The Chinese leader declared that “China and Nepal are two brothers in a blood relationship and nothing can poison their relationship.”¹⁹ Like him, the Chinese had as close a relationship with the Nepalese as the Indians. He said national economic development was a means of securing national independence and that China would do its best to provide financial assistance to Nepal. All this meant that Nepal could not enjoy its independent status just because it was dependent on India; so, in the interest of protecting its independence, foreign relations would become more diverse. However, in October 1956, the then Nepali Foreign Minister Dr. K.I.Singh, during his visit to India, criticized Nepal’s China policy and promised to establish closer ties with India.²⁰

The Nepalese government did not ignore India’s fears because of Nepal’s China policy. To allay India’s fears, Tanaka Prasad Acharya visited India in December 1956 and assured that their policy would not in any way interfere with India’s interests. During the visit, India gave a general reception to the Prime Minister of Nepal and made it clear that it could not satisfy India with its policies. King Mahendra of Nepal dismissed Tanaka Prasad Acharya as Prime Minister in July 1956 to appease India and appointed Dr. K.I.Singh, a pro-India and anti-China, as Prime Minister. However, King Mahendra did not like Dr. K.I. Singh’s management style and dismissed him in November 1956.²¹ This proves that it was not Tanka Prasad Acharya but king Mahendra who was the framer of pro-China Nepal’s foreign policy. His allegation against Dr. K.I. Singh was that Singh had ruined everything he had achieved in foreign policy. Despite all this, India was able to influence Nepal’s China policy. During B.P. Koirala’s visit to China in March 1960, the Chinese government made strenuous efforts to divide India and Nepal. When that effort failed, Zhou-en-lai recommended a peace and friendship agreement between Nepal and China. But Koirala did not accept the recommendation and at the same time rejected the proposal to build a road connecting Tibet and Kathmandu.²²

CONCLUSION:

This positive relationship with India was severed in December 1960 when the king dismissed the ministry headed by Koirala. Delhi condemned the King’s move and also expressed concern and condemnation of the emerging and potential political crisis in the Indian media. The King of Nepal, on the other hand, feared that India might use the political party, the Nepali Congress, against him. So, he continued to use China as a balance against India. So, from that time onwards, India’s grip on Nepal began to lighten and despite India’s dissatisfaction and criticism, King Mahendra himself began to decide on foreign policy or China’s policy.

REFERENCES:

1. Nehru, Jawaharlal, (1954), Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: 1949-1953, Delhi, The Publications Division, p. 147

2. Mullik, B.N., (1971), The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, p. 60

3. Jain, Girilal, (1959), India Meets China in Nepal, New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, p. 104

4. Ibid., p. 106

5. Tse-tung, Mao., (1939), Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, Retrieved from: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_23.htm on 01/04/2020

6. Opcit, Jain, Girilal., (1959), p. 108

7. For the text of the agreement see Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, pp. 56-58

8. Bandopadhyaya, J., (1973) The Making of India’s foreign policy, New Delhi, Allied Publication, p. 14

9. Chitnis, S.G., (1986), The Himalayan Kingdoms, in Gautam Sharma and K.S. Nagar (Eds), India’s Northern Security, Hew Delhi, Reliance Publishing House, p. 134

10. Ibid., p. 135

11. Ibid., p. 135

12. Rose, Leo E., 1971, Nepal Strategy for Survival, London, University of California Press, p.4

13. Panikkar, K.M., (1955), In Two Chinas, London, George Allen and Unwin, p. 171

14. bid., p. 171

15. Sinha, Mira., (1970), Nepal’s Role in Sino-lndian Relations, 1949-1969, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 464

16. The Hindustan Times, 8 May, 1954.

17. The Hindustan Times, 28 September, 1954.

18. The Times of India, 14 November, 1954.

19. Asian Recorder (Delhi) 1957, p. 1301

20. Gorkhapatra, 12 October 1958

21. Asian Recorder (Delhi) 1957, p. 1577

22. Ghoble, T. (1992). India and China - Nepal relations, 1950-1980: an appraisal. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 53, p. 600. Retrieved April 30, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/44142876

Received on 15.03.2022 Modified on 17.05.2022

Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2022;13(3):137-141.

DOI: 10.52711/2321-5828.2022.00023